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As Archilochus1 famously said, “[t]he fox knows many things, but the 
hedgehog knows one big thing.”2  British philosopher Isaiah Berlin popularized 
this maxim in modern times, applying the ancient fable to his study of Tolstoy’s 
theory of history.  In his essay “The Hedgehog and the Fox,” he drew attention to 
Tolstoy’s powers of observation—so astonishing that they enabled the Russian 
author to bring to life the many stories encompassed by the larger tale of Russia’s 
struggle against Napoleonic France, which in turn forged Russia’s national 
                                                            
*  Professor of Law, The Columbus School of Law, at The Catholic University of 
America.  I should disclose that, in the context of my work between 2005 and 2009 as a 
member of the Inter-American Juridical Committee of the Organization of American 
States, and in other related work thereafter, I found Professor Kozolchyk’s scholarship and 
counsel of inestimable value.  This review seeks to explain why his approach to legal 
harmonization in relation to economic development, as fully developed in this volume, 
deserves wider circulation and attention.  
1  Isaiah Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy’s View of History, 
in THE PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND: AN ANTHOLOGY OF ESSAYS 436 (1998). 
2  Id. (citation omitted). In Berlin’s understanding, hedgehogs subject “everything 
to a single central vision, one system, less or more coherent or articulate, in terms of which 
they understand, think and feel—a single, universal organising principle in terms of which 
alone all that they are and say has significance.”  Foxes, by contrast, “pursue many ends, 
often unrelated and even contradictory, connected, if at all, only in some de facto way, for 
some psychological or physiological cause, related to no moral or aesthetic principles. 
These last lead lives, perform acts and entertain ideas that are centrifugal rather than 
centripetal; their thought is scattered or diffused, moving on many levels, seizing upon the 
essence of a vast variety of experiences and objects for that are in themselves, without, 
consciously or unconsciously, seeking to fit them into, or exclude them from, any one 
unchanging, all-embracing, sometimes self-contradictory and incomplete, at times 
fanatical, unitary inner vision.” Id. at 436–37. 
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identity.  Yet Berlin also acknowledged Tolstoy’s abject failure in producing a 
grand theory of history to give synthetic meaning to these events: for Tolstoy was 
a fox failing miserably in an attempt to become a hedgehog.3  Boris Kozolchyk’s 
Comparative Commercial Contracts: Law, Culture and Economic Development 
(CCC)4 also has Tolstoyan aspirations.  But in my view, Kozolchyk’s magnum 
opus is indeed a work that would appeal both to foxes and to hedgehogs without 
deeply dissatisfying either.   
On one hand, Kozolchyk dips into autobiography, anthropology, 
evolutionary biology, economics, sociology, philosophy, comparative religion, 
legal history, and comparative law, to name only a few.  His book sits on a 
pedestal of vast learning, enticing the foxes of the world to enjoy its various parts; 
thus, it is part treatise, part casebook, and part conversation with the reader.  It is 
therefore many books in one, written for multiple audiences.  One can dip into its 
various parts for provisional enrichment.  Admittedly, it is not beyond criticism in 
its assessment of each of these elements.  Yet, in so many ways, it is an 
intellectual feast of varied delicacies.  Like a fox, Kozolchyk presents multiple 
sharp and distinct images of reality, analyzing in remarkable detail the various 
contexts in which different commercial law regimes have arisen, explaining the 
underlying material contexts and mentalities upon which different legal regimes 
have stood.  Indeed, CCC’s various parts and even individual chapters could, with 
only modest expansion, serve as coherent books themselves.   
But CCC is more than that: it can be read as one sustained argument, 
integrating its parts into a greater whole that places all the details the fox sees in a 
central truth grasped by the hedgehog.  It articulates a vision for which any 
hedgehog would be proud—a sustained examination of the conditions necessary 
for a law of commercial contracts to enable and empower all persons (but 
especially the poor and other excluded groups) to enjoy the benefits of 
development, both materially and in the expression of their basic human freedom 
to develop their creative faculties.  At the risk of oversimplifying, Kozolchyk 
argues that it is through access to the credit necessary for small and medium sized 
enterprises to take entrepreneurial risks—in a way that simultaneously protects 
third parties and reflects the customary moral intuitions of the most respected 
                                                            
3  Id. at 498. For Berlin, “Tolstoy’s sense of reality was until the end too 
devastating to be compatible with any moral ideal which he was able to construct out of the 
fragments into which his intellect shivered the world, and he dedicated all his vast strength 
of mind and will to the lifelong denial of this fact.” Id. 
4  BORIS KOZOLCHYK, COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS: LAW, CULTURE 
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2014) [hereinafter KOZOLCHYK, CCC].  One point of 
concern for this reader is the number of editorial errors, which although understandable in a 
1,200 plus page volume, perhaps also evidences the general decline of text editing services 
in the current legal publishing environment.  See also Boris Kozolchyk, The Modernization 
and Harmonization of Commercial Law in the Trans-Pacific Region in the Twenty-First 
Century: The Need for a New Research and Drafting Methodology, 33 ARIZ. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 25 (2016) [hereinafter Kozolchyk, Trans-Pacific] (offering a useful, but not 
nearly as rich, summary of Kozolchyk’s central insights as a prelude to discussing a 
strategy for future progress).  
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practices in particular social settings, arguably understood as the best merchants’ 
understanding of good faith—that these goals can be achieved.  It is, moreover, an 
approach Kozolchyk finds best suited to the requirements of our age of 
globalization.  
Part I of this essay will explain the various parts of Kozolchyk’s 
achievement, detailing the structure of the volume, its various contributions and 
connections to various fields of scholarship, and its key insights as to each of its 
subjects.  Part II will unravel the moral and philosophical—indeed, religious—
elements of Kozolchyk’s conceptual achievement, both in its constituent element 
of the archetypal merchant as a bonus vir (a good man or person) and the 
conception of justice as fairness and reasonableness it is meant to serve.  This part 
will show that Kozolchyk joins a longstanding debate about the morality of 
market society,5 one that has been given new salience as protectionist forces now 
enjoy a resurgence in response to dislocations brought about by the most recent 
wave of globalization.6  Part III will argue that Kozolchyk’s success as both 
hedgehog and fox, and the power of his contribution to the debate about the moral 
qualities of market life, can be explained by the origins of his magnum opus: a 
career of engaged practical scholarship, in part as Director of The National Law 
Center for Inter-American Free Trade (NLCIFT), affiliated with The University of 
Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law.  As Director, he has played a central 
role in developing practical instruments for legal harmonization in the Western 
Hemisphere, especially between the United States and the Caribbean Basin 
countries.  This part will track the increasing influence of Kozolchyk’s vision in 
legal developments in the Western hemisphere through his influence on 
developments under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and in 
the Specialized Conference on Private International Law (CIDIP),7 which operates 
under the auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS).  Finally, Part 
IV of this essay, drawing in part on suggestions in CCC but more significantly on 
literature concerning the creation and erosion of the social norms supporting trust 
in economic life, will identify challenges that trade with China may pose for 
commercial law reasoning and practices based on Kozolchyk’s understanding of 
the bonus vir.  In light of this concern, it concludes that CCC will serve as an 
inestimable resource for those interested in the evolution of Western hemispheric 
                                                            
5  See Albert O. Hirschman, Rival Views of Market Society, in RIVAL VIEWS OF 
MARKET SOCIETY AND OTHER RECENT ESSAYS 105 (1986) (detailing the two strands of 
orientation of the moral effects of market life: one—the so-called “doux-commerce” 
thesis—under which market life instills personal virtue; the other—the so-called “self-
destruction” thesis—under which market life is corrosive of private virtue and ultimately 
erodes the moral foundations of private life necessary for its survival). 
6  See generally Mark Blyth, Capitalism in Crisis: What Went Wrong and What 
Comes Next, 95 FOREIGN AFF. 172 (2016) (reviewing several books offering competing 
views on the sustainability of modern capitalism).  
7  The CIDIP’s abbreviation follows its Spanish title, “Conferencia Especializada 
para el Derecho Internacional Privado.” ORGANIZACIÓN DE LOS ESTADOS AMERICANOS, 
https://www.oas.org/dil/esp/derecho_internacional_privado_desarrollo.htm (last visited 
Sept. 29, 2016). 
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and East Asian Trade under the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TTP), 
providing another generation of scholars and practitioners with a welcoming 
launch pad for their own efforts to unite theory with practice as faithfully as 
Kozolchyk’s exemplary effort in this volume, perhaps serving as a legacy even 
greater than CCC itself.  
 
 
I. THE FOX’S MANY INSIGHTS 
 
Kozolchyk’s book is divided into five parts and totals thirty chapters, 
beginning with a theoretical framework and practical vocabulary founded on 
Roman law, moving to the medieval structure of guilds and notaries to restrain 
trade, exploring the emergence of Western European codes law in the ashes of 
medievalism, then showing counter-examples where less progress was made in 
Latin America, the Soviet Union and China, and finally reaching the apotheosis of 
commercial law in Anglo-American invention.  Reading CCC from beginning to 
end takes the reader through a wonderful journey in legal history, sociology, 
politics, and economics through many lands, a large number of which will be 
foreign territory to readers who have specialized only in particular disciplines.  
Yet Kozolchyk is a superb guide.  
Part I outlines the book’s basic themes, exploring what Kozolchyk calls 
the “logic of the reasonable,” particularly as expressed in the insightful opinions 
of the giants of the common law, Lord Mansfield and Judges Friendly and 
Cardozo.8  Part I then lays the foundation for a history of comparative law by 
explaining through an anthropological lens the role executory promises play in 
facilitating the provision of credit to enable production and exchange in the shift 
from agricultural to commercial society.9  But the real payoff in these chapters 
comes in detailed case studies: one concerning the cultural context for 
competition;10 the other, an illustrative case study of Kozolchyk’s own effort in 
the OAS Model Law on Secured Transactions to adapt modern commercial 
understandings to the Latin American cultural context.11  These case studies 
(presented in the form of appendices to introductory chapters) immediately allow 
the reader to apprehend the specific factual contexts in which Kozolchyk’s 
                                                            
8  See KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 54–65.  
9  See id. at 81–102.  
10  See id. at 22–34 (discussing erroneous assumptions about Japanese business 
culture that might have mislead the U.S. Supreme Court in the predatory pricing decision, 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)) (citations 
omitted). 
11  See id. at 66–79.  See Organization of American States, Model Inter-American 
Law on Secured Transactions, http://www.oas.org/dil/uniform%20law%20review.pdf 
(2002) [hereinafter OAS, Model Secured Transactions].  This Model Law was in turn based 
on 12 principles produced by a drafting conference composed of Western hemispheric 
experts meeting under the auspices of the NLCIFT.  See Meeting of OAS-CIDIP VI 
Drafting Committee on Secured Transactions Conference Transcript, 18 ARIZ. J. INT’L 
COMP. L. 334 (2001).  
 The Hedgehog, the Fox, and Kozolchyk 69 		
 
methodology can be employed.  Yet, as a prelude to his discussion of the OAS 
Model Law on Secured Transactions, Kozolchyk also plants the seeds of the 
volume’s central message with an account of Emperor Constantine’s repeal of the 
Pactum Commissorium.  This traditional Roman right permitted creditors to 
repossess or foreclose on collateral, thus facilitating the flow of credit.  
Constantine, in Kozolchyk’s telling, judged it more important to enforce a 
prohibition against usury inspired by Christian theology and to protect 
impoverished Christian debtors from rapacious creditors.12  Part I thus concludes 
with an exquisite introduction to Roman law as the foundation for the evolution of 
commercial systems in medieval and modern Europe, which, while complete in 
itself, also forms the legal-factual matrix for all further Western discussion of 
commercial law.  Here, Kozolchyk introduces the concept of Ulpian’s bonus vir as 
a legal standard and, with a series of excerpted opinions from the Corpus Juris 
Civilis, brings to life that Roman concept, which might have served as an 
alternative to Constantine’s blunt rejection of all creditor rights.13  
Part II of CCC takes the reader through a detailed study of medieval 
commercial practices, bringing to life the practical limitations imposed on 
commerce and market access by guilds, agency rules, and notaries.  Here, 
Kozolchyk makes clear that the combination of these rules limited commerce—
particularly through their failure to protect those relying on the apparent authority 
of commercial agents.  This was in part because the conceptual problem based on 
the Roman theory of typification of contracts, under which a kind of numerus 
clausus (closed number) principle limited the kinds of contractual exchanges that 
might be enforced, thereby excluding theories of unilateral contract or reliance-
based reasoning.14  This theoretical prison served only to reduce protection for 
third parties and thereby to obstruct the flow of credit.  Perhaps more importantly, 
it gave rise to a perception that commerce was ignoble or corrupt; for example, the 
paradigm of the “Picaresque” or shifty tradesman in Spanish medieval culture 
assumed that such a merchant would pass on bad debts in a kind of habitual Ponzi 
scheme.15 (Much later in the volume, in one charming dialogue with a Mexican 
law professor about Mexican cultural attitudes, Kozolchyk’s Mexican interlocutor 
refers to the “natural or God-given right to smuggle.”16)  Indeed, high levels of 
corruption prompted high levels of regulation and authentication, thus 
engendering the rise of guilds and notaries, which (despite their intention to 
prevent corruption) in effect foreclosed competition and facilitated the extraction 
of bribes and other side payments.17  Yet Kozolchyk also shows that formalistic 
rules promising legal certainty and barring the enforcement of unilateral promises 
or rights based on reasonable reliance induced market exchanges through 
circumvention (what he calls a “simulation” of a real exchange based on unilateral 
                                                            
12  See KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 70.   
13  See id. at 128-35. 
14  See id. at 150-51.   
15  See id. at 143-45.   
16  Id. at 538. 
17  See KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 191-242.   
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promises or reliance through the legal form of a false bilateral exchange).18  But 
these fraudulent (albeit practical) instruments came at the price of initially higher 
transactional costs from requiring unnecessary false formalities, offered less value 
than fully-legal transactions (since the possibility they could later be deemed 
fraudulent forced market participants to discount the price they would be willing 
to pay to accept that legal risk), and further damaged the reputation of merchants 
for honesty and reliability, with effects well into modernity.19  Most critically, 
Kozolchyk shows that the principal vehicle for circumvention of the dogmatic 
rules against usury, unilateral commitments, and reliance-based reasoning came 
primarily from the religiously-inspired practices of the medieval Jewish 
brotherhood of merchants, who served as reliable intermediaries willing to enforce 
unilateral commitments upon which contract parties could reasonably rely.20  As 
discussed in Part II of this essay, this insight becomes the root premise in the 
hedgehog’s understanding of the foundations for commerce.21  
Parts III and IV of CCC form a pair, though they can be studied 
separately.  Part III addresses the emergence of modern Western European codes 
and the varying degrees of progress they have made in freeing themselves from 
the chains of medieval dogmatism.  In exploring post-Enlightenment European 
codification efforts, Kozolchyk crucially differentiates between the French and 
German experience.  French influence peaked in the immediate aftermath of Latin 
American independence following the Napoleonic Wars, as Latin American 
codification efforts were crucially influenced by the French model.  Rationalism 
and deductive logic,22 coupled with the French Revolutionary (as well as 
Napoleon’s own personal) prejudice against merchants and in favor of debtor 
small-landholding bourgeoisie,23 resulted in a Code Civil that was dominated by 
the amorphous concept of causa.  Briefly, this concept can be understood to 
sanction only specific kinds of contracts; thus, it prevented the natural evolution 
of commercial instruments to create new forms of contracts, or soften the 
requirements for enforcement of existing contractual forms, to meet changing 
social and economic needs.24  French law thus evidenced tortured decisional 
reasoning in concrete cases as the gap between the Code Civil and the Code de 
                                                            
18  Id. at 150–52 (quoting Raymond de Roover’s description of the typical 
“simulation” of an exchange transaction of foreign currency, coupled with a commission, to 
disguise the charging of interest on a loan). Id. at 510–13 (discussing the Mexican practice 
of fraudulent or disguised transactions, “simulations,” designed to circumvent legal 
prohibitions) (citations omitted).   
19  See id. at 145–48.   
20  See id. at 153–63. Kozolchyk acknowledges that the recorded practices of 
English wool merchants may also have played a role in circumventing medieval Canonical 
restrictions on the advance of credit to facilitate production and exchange and the special 
influence of Henry VIII’s 1545 Statute of Usury, which regulated rather than prohibited the 
charging of interest.  KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 156. 
21  See infra Part II. 
22  See KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 245–68. 
23  See id. at 268–80. 
24  See id. at 280–96.   
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Commerce of 1807, on one hand, and commercial realities in which they were 
applied on the other, became insurmountable during the explosive growth of 
industry and enterprise in the 19th and 20th centuries.  Unlike German law, 
French law to this day limits reliance-based reasoning and provides excessive 
protection to familial interests in property, thus frustrating the protection of third-
party interests and thereby limiting the development of robust markets protecting 
creditors and enabling the supply of credit.25  In a wonderful case study of the 
Mexican Civil Code (which is based on French law) Kozolchyk shows the barriers 
this French inheritance raised for even the simplest real estate transactions, given 
the absence of reliable mechanisms to ensure the transfer of title pursuant to 
agreement or even to structure enforceable escrow agreements that could 
overcome the lack of trust between strangers in commercial transactions.26  
In contrast, the German Codes—both the German Commercial Code of 
1897 (HGB), and the German Civil Code of 1900 (BGB)—drew on a century of 
practice rather than abstract theory.  Thus, the needs of emerging German 
industry, agriculture, commerce, and especially finance set the context for more 
open-textured legal language that in a sense ratified emerging German practice.27  
These Codes did not employ a causa-inspired numerus clausus approach to the 
validity of contracts, thus opening the door to the negotiation and enforcement of 
unilateral merchant promises, such as bills of exchange by bona fide purchasers 
for value, and approving the emerging commercial instruments for supplying 
credit.  Moreover, unlike French law’s reliance on strict rules, the German Codes 
relied on principles of good faith—both as a general duty in the performance, 
execution and even the negotiation of contracts and as the basis for allowing 
courts to adjust the meaning of contracts to meet new circumstances.28  Kozolchyk 
here observes that German doctrinal writing and codification practice were 
immensely consequential in the United States through their influence on Karl 
Llewellyn, the chief draftsman of the Uniform Commercial Code,29 thus 
reinforcing the different trajectories of the United States and Latin America in the 
development of their respective commercial laws and foreshadowing Kozolchyk’s 
detailed analysis of the characteristics of Anglo-American commercial law in Part 
V of CCC.30  
Good teachers teach by counter-example, just as good first-year contracts 
teachers sometimes teach the common law of contract by contrasting it with UCC 
solutions; and Part IV reveals that Kozolchyk, whatever else he may be 
(economist, anthropologist, historian, or philosopher), is a fabulous teacher.  It 
provides a detailed analysis of the three cases of Latin America, the former Soviet 
Union, and China, in which various factors—colonial heritage, what Kozolchyk 
                                                            
25  See id. at 297–373.   
26  See id. at 373–76. 
27  See KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 381–96 (discussing German commercial 
practice and the role of scholarship).   
28  See id. at 413–38.   
29  See id. at 440–49. 
30  See infra text accompanying note 35.  
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calls the “invertebrate” character of a legal system, and a dysfunctional cultural 
commitment to preferring family members to strangers—frustrated the emergence 
of commercial legal systems.  For this reader, these are the most enriching studies 
in CCC.  Kozolchyk reveals in excruciating detail the many limitations caused by 
“familism” in Latin America, which unduly privileges family interests at the 
expense of innocent third parties.31  Similarly, he shows that reasonable third 
parties could find no protection from authoritarian-legalism in the former Soviet 
Union, as well perhaps as in Russia today,32 under what he calls an “invertebrate” 
system of commercial law—a law  
 
whose factual and normative components were so imprecise that 
they enlarged the power (and all too often filled the pockets) of 
government officials, starting with the policeman who waived a 
fine or prohibition in exchange for a bribe, and extending to the 
directors of state enterprises and planners of the USSR’s 
economy.33  
 
The combination of familism and authoritarian-legalism potentially at work in 
modern China posed obvious challenges for the development of global commercial 
law and will be the subject of the final part of this essay.34 
Part V is the culmination of CCC, for it analyzes in detail the 
mechanisms through which modern English and American commercial law 
facilitate economic exchange.  These chapters serve as a mini-course in the law of 
international business transactions, as well as comparative modern commercial 
law, and as a superb introduction for “civilians” (i.e., those trained in the civil law 
tradition) to the sources and methods of Anglo-American law and the socio-
economic contexts in which the British and US systems arose.35   
For the purposes of acquiring a firm grasp of the hedgehog’s vision 
underlying CCC, which is the subject of Part II of this essay, one should give a 
close reading to Kozolchyk’s masterful recital of the emergence of the modern 
law validating commercial and standby letters of credit (LOC).  This detailed case 
study focuses on the practices of merchant bankers and the private codification of 
their best practices through multiple versions of the Uniform Customs and 
Practices for Documentary Credits (UCP) promulgated by the International 
Chamber of Commerce.36  The UCP’s terms became the law of the contracts in 
this specialized context and set the basic expectations of the parties in modern 
                                                            
31  See KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 475–543.   
32  See id. at 545–621. 
33  Id. at 546.   
34  See infra text accompanying note 109.   
35  See generally KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 749–858.   
36  See George L. Ridgeway, MERCHANTS OF PEACE: THE HISTORY OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (1959), cited in KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, 
at 1058 n.114 (detailing the history of the ICC, including its role in the development of the 
UCP).   
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LOC practice, which for decades has facilitated international exchange by 
providing a secure means of payment, enforceable notwithstanding breach or 
other infirmities in their related buyer-seller goods and shipment contracts.  By 
assuring payment based on the presentation of documents of title alone, which 
thereby gives banks an enforceable collection mechanism against collateral, the 
provision of credit and payment are assured.  Thus, like possession of a negotiable 
instrument in the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value, the beneficiary of an 
LOC can enforce, subject to very limited exceptions, the instrument 
notwithstanding underlying defects in the exchange between the parties 
originating the instrument.  With certainty of enforceability, moreover, these 
instruments can serve also as a form of credit (since beneficiaries of LOCs, for an 
appropriate discount reflecting the parties’ different needs for immediate funds, 
can transfer their collection rights to purchasers for value, who then may enforce 
their rights to collection); and, much like accounts receivables in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence, they can serve as a form of collateral for the extension of credit.37  
In short, LOCs not only overcome the legal risk of nonpayment endemic in 
international trade, but they also facilitate the flow of credit to those seeking to 
enter global markets.  While this brief and imprecise summary cannot do justice to 
Kozolchyk’s fox-like description of the legal advances in LOC law in the last 
century, it does provide a segue for addressing Kozolchyk’s hedgehog-like overall 
thesis explaining how instruments of such global importance as LOCs emerged, in 
fact, out of legal nothingness.   
Kozolchyk proceeds to show that it was only when bankers made what 
one might call a “leap of faith” that LOCs emerged.  Less metaphorically, 
Kozolchyk notes that relatively equal bankers, who sometimes are issuing banks 
and sometimes are collecting banks (and therefore had an interest in respecting the 
interests of other parties because the shoe, so to speak, may soon be on the other 
foot), initiated the practice of commercial letters of credit through an 
unenforceable act of generosity.  The bank issuing the LOC would give 
“something of value to the beneficiary (the authorization to draw) without 
receiving an immediate equivalent from him.”38  That the “issuing bank gained the 
trust of the beneficiary and of subsequent participants in the transaction, including 
its correspondent banks, for the issuing bank was sufficient consideration.”39  But 
here the word “consideration” is used in a non-technical legal sense, since it is at 
odds with the general understanding that past consideration does not constitute a 
bargained-for exchange.  Rather, it is a gift that seeks to induce reciprocal 
altruism.  
 
 
                                                            
37  See KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 1049–51.   
38  Id. at 1053.   
39  See id. at 1053, 1075–80 (summarizing these developments and expressing 
concern that the effort to maximize bank shareholder value is causing the proliferation of 
unethical practices inconsistent with ethically sound customs that gave rise to the modern 
LOC).   
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II. THE HEDGEHOG’S GREAT TRUTH  
 
Because Kozolchyk’s central insight regarding the gift-giving origins of 
even such a sophisticated and globalized transaction as the modern LOC comes at 
the end of the book, one could also read CCC backwards, as if unpeeling the 
layers of an onion or, as might an archeologist, uncovering the layers of 
foundations of an important site until one reaches the earliest forms of civilization.  
This thought-experiment might help a reader to develop a clearer understanding of 
the hedgehog’s vision.   
Thus, modern Anglo-American commercial law that facilitates 
enforcement of unbargained-for offers in specific contexts,40 relies on sectoral 
customary practices as a critical measure of good faith,41 and effectively protects 
third parties acting in good faith through judicially-authorized specific 
performance and self-help remedies, such as providing secured parties an 
immediate right to take possession of the collateral after default.42  This current 
synthesis could be viewed as building on the advances made by German code 
drafters through a somewhat amorphous conception of good faith,43 although the 
BGB and HGB provided more legal clarity and third-party protection than French 
and Latin American Codes,44 not to mention the more primitive conceptions of so-
called invertebrate and authoritarian law.  But these modern systems all found 
their sources in the central dilemma posed by Roman and medieval law’s search 
for commercial law principles only through deductive reasoning from initial 
premises grounded in an Aristotelian pursuit of the “essential” elements of 
commutative justice in a fair exchange, including a prohibition of interest, a 
theory that fatally ignored social facts.45  Yet the genius of Roman law during the 
Republican praetorian period was precisely to enable the system of praetors as 
promulgators of legal formulas, iudices as triers of fact, and jurisconsults as 
external experts, working together, to adapt Roman law to changing facts—both 
to soften the rigors of the civil law with a ius honorarium, much like the English 
Chancellor’s invention of equitable remedies; and to adapt the Roman civil law to 
form a ius gentium for Romans and non-Romans alike.   
In sum, for wisdom on how to proceed in the modern world trading 
system’s attempt to harmonize now globally multiple legal systems in the story, 
Kozolchyk returns to the first phases of globalization in antiquity and that first 
effort to construct a living ius gentium.46  Viewed this way, CCC itself reads like 
Euclid’s elements, which have influenced so many political thinkers (Abraham 
                                                            
40  See id. at 908–14 (especially the so-called “merchant’s firm offer”). 
41  See id. at 972–77. 
42  See KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 1162–63, 1184–88, 1211. 
43  See id. at 437–38 (the requirement of “Treu und Glauben”). 
44  See id. at 435–36 (providing an extremely useful chart comparing the 
differences). 
45  See id. at 149–51 (citations omitted). 
46  See id. at 105–25. 
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Lincoln47 and Thomas Hobbes48 among them) to believe that agreement on 
foundational assumptions is at the core of reasoned discourse, even in political 
economy.  It may be ironic, however, that the gist of Kozolchyk’s argument—
namely, that deductive systems of commercial law impede the development of 
commerce—is presented in the form of a series of deductive inferences from a set 
of foundational postulates.  
At its root, however, Kozolchyk’s chain of argument is premised on a 
particular conception of human nature.  Significantly, he closes the volume with 
an attack on the Law & Economics movement, which he believes is based on a 
flawed understanding of human motivation as entirely selfish.  Law grounded on 
that premise, he argues, fails to recognize the socio-biologist’s “eusociality,” or an 
anthropologist’s “reciprocal altruism,” in our natures.  It fails to perceive that the 
best practices of the most honorable merchant (Ulpian’s bonus vir) are the true 
and therefore most effective measure for law and its adjudication in a way that 
serves the common good.49  In this sense, while rejecting Aristotle’s essentialism 
as a logical system, he reclaims another part of Aristotelian thought—namely, the 
belief that moral virtue lies in the habitual pursuit of excellence.50  
Indeed, one could go further, for Kozolchyk’s conception of human 
nature arguably is grounded—not just on sociobiology, anthropology and abstract 
moral philosophy—but perhaps more deeply on a religiously-inspired insight as to 
commercial morality and morality more generally: namely, Rabbi Hillel’s 
understanding that selfishness and altruism must find a reasonable 
accommodation in human life, for “if I am not for myself, who will be for me, and 
if I am [only] for myself, what am I.”51  In Part III, while discussing and 
criticizing the formalistic conception of virtue in medieval fair courts as part of 
the process of European codification, he alludes also to Talmudic thought’s Fable 
of the Evil Impulse.  This thirteen-century old poem warns that any attempt to 
destroy all “evil desire” will only bring about “passion, avarice and greed,” which 
must then entail the recognition that in human life, “[t]here will be good in evil, as 
                                                            
47  See generally Antonio F. Perez, Lincoln’s Legacy for American International 
Law, 28 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 167, 225–26 (2014) (discussing Lincoln’s encounter with 
Euclid in the late 1840s and the role it played in helping Lincoln to view the Declaration’s 
commitment to equality, rather than the Constitution’s rotten compromise, as the 
foundational axiom for political discussion of the question of slavery).  
48  See generally Hardy Grant, Geometry and Politics: Mathematics in the Thought 
of Thomas Hobbes, 63 MATHEMATICS MAG. 147 (1990) (discussing Hobbes’ effort in 
LEVIATHAN to move from foundational premises to a theory of politics). 
49  See KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 1233–45.   
50  See Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea (Nichomachean Ethics), in THE BASIC WORKS 
OF ARISTOTLE 952–59 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941); see also ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, 
COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE’S NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 103–06 (C.J. Litzinger trans., 
Dumb Ox Books rev. ed. 1993). 
51  See KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 169 n.142 (citations omitted). This 
moderate altruism or “eusociality” finds its roots, for Kozolchyk, also in the Behavioral 
Darwinist theories of E.O. Wilson. See id. at 8–10 (citations omitted). 
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there is evil in good.”52 This ethic characterized the Jewish communities of 
medieval traders53 and could be observed even more clearly in the life story of 
Baron von Rothschild, who exemplified the “brotherly” and moderately altruistic 
values Kozolchyk deems characteristic of the archetypal, or most respected, 
merchant.54  In short, the religiously inspired values of the medieval and modern 
                                                            
52  Id. at 317 n.120.  It is impossible to pass on this thought without recognizing its 
potentially Machiavellian implications.  For a Catholic, this Talmudic thought could be 
interpreted to challenge the traditional Catholic teaching that one ought not to do evil so 
that good may come of it.  See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶¶ 1749–61, http://
www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p3s1c1a4.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 
2016).  But that principle is qualified by the principle of “double effect,” namely, that mere 
awareness that an act motivated by a good purpose may have evil or harmful effects does 
not necessarily make the act wrongful, but an understanding that significant harms 
outweighing the benefit are likely would call into question otherwise well-motivated acts.  
See Doctrine of Double Effect, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Sept. 23, 2014), http://plato
.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect/.  Here, the thought of German sociologist Max Weber 
becomes helpful in situating Kozolchyk’s position.  Weber, in a seminal lecture and essay 
that helped to shape public discourse in post-WWI Germany, distinguished in politics 
between an “ethic of ultimate ends” where one pursues an absolutist agenda and an “ethic 
of responsibility” under which one takes account of the consequences of one’s high-minded 
goals.  See Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, reprinted in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN 
SOCIOLOGY 77 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. trans., 1946).  Kozolchyk’s analysis, 
properly understood, embodies an “ethic of responsibility,” under which “normative charity 
focuses not only on the beneficence of an act, but on its empowering effects” too.  See 
KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 318.  Thus, if commercial rules unrealistically 
grounded on behavioral assumptions of pure normative charity result in poverty, the 
principle of double effect in tandem with an ethic of responsibility would allow one to 
judge that rules based on normative charity alone must be modified.  
53  See KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 153–63 (drawing attention to the role of 
Maimonides’ teachings) (citations omitted).  See also Paul R. Milgrom et al., The Role of 
Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the 
Champagne Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1 (1990) (discussing an economic model on the role of 
private judges in medieval fairs).  
54  See KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 397–407 (relying heavily on acclaimed 
biography NIALL FERGUSON, HOUSE OF ROTHSCHILD (1999)) (citation omitted). That said, it 
is possible that Kozolchyk’s argument is subject to counter-examples showing that trust 
networks thrive only in oligopolized markets, where the sanction of exclusion from a close 
knit community substitutes for legal enforcement mechanisms.  As Barak Richman argues, 
the network of largely Jewish diamond dealers in New York City’s diamond district has 
unraveled precisely because its privileged position has dissolved, reducing the benefits of 
membership and the opportunity cost of exclusion.  See generally Barak D. Richman, An 
Autopsy of Cooperation: Diamond Dealers and the Limits of Trust-Based Exchange (Apr. 
13, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2764470.  With the rise of 
alternative channels of diamond supply—new Australian production mediated by South 
Asian merchants—coupled with De Beers’ new strategy of vertical integration in place of 
using New York intermediaries, Jewish merchants in New York no longer perceive the 
benefits of observing the norms that made them indispensable intermediaries in facilitating 
credit sales in the market for a product, such as diamonds, that can easily evade formal, 
legal collection mechanisms. See id.   
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communities of Jewish traders and financiers serve as the practical exemplars of 
Kozolchyk’s theory. 
Fleshing out this theory, the archetypal merchant, living a practical 
morality of moderate altruism, becomes the root premise for commercial 
development.  Here, the bon mot (or clever phrase) becomes the mot juste (or 
exact phrase) in Kozolchyk’s discourse, as he employs the term “nuclear” 
elements of the exchange to argue that the original or “nuclear” parties to a 
transaction, such as the original creditor and debtor, must give third parties the 
same treatment in good faith they give each other, even though these third parties 
are strangers and are not part of the “nuclear” or original parties to the exchange.55  
Thus, the bon mot, “nuclear”—an apparent analogy to nuclear physics and the 
constituent parties of all matter—may also, perhaps in an unintended pun, serve as 
the mot juste that reflects Kozolchyk’s core idea that enhanced good faith morality 
of the archetypal merchant gives to third parties equality of treatment as if they 
were initial parties to the exchange, as if they were the members of the very same 
“nuclear” families or kinship groups.  This line of thought is consistent with 
Kozolchyk’s belief that the modern trade concept of “national treatment,” which 
has become central to the WTO, GATT, NAFTA, and CAFTA, to name only a 
few trade agreements, is connected to the medieval idea of the so-called “peace of 
the market.”56  For Kozolchyk, these successful commercial practices, such as 
both national treatment and the medieval peace of the market, are manifestations 
of the behavioral regularity, custom, or ethical or philosophical principle 
(depending on the disciplinary focus one may employ) that strangers ought to be 
treated as “brothers” or “neighbors.”  Thus, in the case of credit systems, it is only 
through a rich understanding of the interaction between selfishness and altruism, 
and a firm grasp of the particular factual nuclear elements of a commercial 
practice, that comparative legal reform can enable law and lawyers to become a 
vehicle for doing well by doing good.57  In CCC’s Epilogue, Kozolchyk returns to 
this foundational thesis, observing that globalization, growing interaction, and the 
accumulation of experience may facilitate the emergence of the best practices of 
the archetypal global merchant.58  One can extrapolate the beneficial 
consequences for global economic development if Kozolchyk’s vision, as 
hedgehog, can be universalized.    
                                                            
55  See KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 1034–38.   
56  See id. at 304–05 (the medieval institution of the so-called “peace of the market,” 
which provided for safe conducts immunizing traders and their goods from capture under 
letters of marque and reprisal).   
57  See id. at 1038–39.   
58  See id. at 1247–48. 
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For Latin Americans, however, living under a pervasively Catholic 
culture and an Aristotelian intellectual tradition, Kozolchyk’s rejection of 
Aristotelian “essentialism” and its “static” conception of contractual relations and 
appeal to Talmudic principles may well pose a challenge.59  Indeed, Kozolchyk 
even wants to make clear that Christian charity “as a form of doing business and 
judicial decision-making suffers from inherently crippling limitations.”60  Yet, 
despite Kozolchyk’s frank appraisal that dogmatic medieval Catholic legal 
thought’s misunderstanding of the role of money and interest (with its pre-Marxist 
distrust of capital as such), it seems that his understanding of archetypal merchant 
conduct arguably overlaps with Christian moral teaching.  Like Kozolchyk, 
Catholic thought sees virtue as habitual practice.61  Moreover, central to Catholic 
social teaching, which informs Catholic understanding of economic life as well, is 
the protection of the stranger; for, in response to the question “Who is my 
neighbor?”—by a lawyer who seeks to know how to interpret Jesus’s instruction 
to love not only God but also one’s neighbor—Jesus tells the Parable of the Good 
Samaritan.62  Latin American Catholics would acknowledge that Talmudic 
teachings that are consistent with Catholic intuitions might serve as a basis for 
legal reform, and surely they would acknowledge that the Roman Church’s 
medieval misunderstanding of the role of credit has been transcended by the 
modern Church’s acceptance of the potential virtues of private property and 
market life.63  If so, an interfaith dialogue between the Talmudic insights 
                                                            
59  See id. at 150.   
60  KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 317 (purporting to disagree with Amalia D. 
Kessler, Enforcing Virtue: Social Norms and Self-Interest in an Eighteenth-Century 
Merchant Court, 22 L. & HIST. REV. 71 (2004)). 
61  See AQUINAS, supra note 50 (“Lecture VI: Virtue, a Kind of Habit”). 
62  See Luke 10:25–37 (Jerusalem).  
63  See, e.g., Pope John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Centesimus Annus ¶ 42 (May, 1 
1991), http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_01
051991_centesimus-annus.html [hereinafter Centesimus Annus] (giving qualified 
acceptance to capitalism).  See also Michael Novak, Capitalism Rightly Understood: The 
View of Christian Humanism, ETERNAL WORLD TELEVISION NETWORK, http://www.ewtn
.com/library/business/fr91401.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2016) (providing a sophisticated 
account of the balance John Paul II struck between the virtues embedded in capitalism and 
the necessary elements of a reform agenda).  Indeed, John Paul II recognized, like the 
Talmudists, that “where self-interest is violently suppressed, it is replaced by a burdensome 
system of bureaucratic control which dries up the wellsprings of initiative and creativity.”  
Centesimus Annus, supra, ¶ 25. See also MICHAEL NOVAK, THE CATHOLIC ETHIC AND THE 
SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (1993).  It should be acknowledged, however, that the Church 
continues to struggle in its understanding of the nature of economic life.  Most recently, 
Pope Francis opined: “In fact, if the market is governed solely by the principle of the 
equivalence in value of exchanged goods, it cannot produce the social cohesion that it 
requires in order to function well.” Pope Benedict XVI, Encyclical Letter Caritas in 
Veritate ¶ 35 (June 29, 2009), http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/encyclicals
/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20090629_caritas-in-veritate.html. See also Pope Francis, 
Apostolic Exhortation Evangelii Gaudium (Nov. 24, 2013), http://w2.vatican.va/content
/francesco/en/apost_exhortations/documents/papa-francesco_esortazione-ap_20131124
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Kozolchyk brings to bear and a modern Catholic understanding of the role of the 
market and free trade in eliminating global poverty would be in order.  In 
promoting this foundational dialogue, which could extend to other faiths and 
secular traditions, Kozolchyk’s work thus serves far deeper purposes than even he 
may realize.   
Indeed, Kozolchyk’s central Talmudic insights can also be located in a 
tension, not just between different faith traditions, but also found among those 
who reason from non-Judeo-Christian or wholly secular perspectives.  This 
debate, or tension, is also a longstanding dialectic in the market’s encounter with 
morality.  In a recent formulation, political economist and intellectual historian 
Albert Hirschman famously distinguished between the so-called sweet or “doux-
commerce” thesis and the so-called “self-destruction” thesis.  Under the former—
long associated with the thought of Montesquieu, David Hume, and Adam 
Smith—market society is conducive to good manners, opposition to violence, 
frugality, punctuality, and probity.64  So-called “scientific” socialists, such as 
Marx, advancing the self-destruction thesis argued that the internal logic of 
capitalism would bring about “an ever-more numerous and more class-conscious 
and combative proletariat.”65  Meanwhile, conservatives, such as Bolingbroke, 
feared that “all social bonds were dissolved through money.”66  
But for Hirschman, rather than empirical questions, these competing 
theses evidence merely the cycling of ideas, since the so-called doux-commerce 
thesis prompted the self-destruction thesis, each of which continued to be 
reformulated again and again within various disciplines.  In the 20th century, 
Horkheimer’s Frankfurt School’s neo-Marxism argued, like Bolingbroke, that 
Western civilization was destroying the intellectual and cultural basis for that 
civilization’s existence.67  Meanwhile, conservative self-destruction theories were 
reformulated in rationalist terms—such as Schumpeter “creative destruction” of 
existing markets through technological advance, leaving incumbent workers and 
businesses behind with enormous adjustment costs;68 as the game-theoretic 
account of the prevalence of self-interested behavior in strategic interactions 
popularized by the Prisoners’ Dilemma; 69 or, as Kozolchyk might add, the “Law 
& Economics” movement.70  And, in a work that would be of particular interest to 
Kozolchyk, Hirschman refers to German sociologist Simmel’s observation that 
                                                            
_evangelii-gaudium.html.  Sadly, this is based on a fundamental misconception, since 
market exchanges are based precisely on the different perception that market participants 
have about the value of exchanged goods, thereby giving rise to an exchange under which 
both sides believe their positions have improved, which in turn furthers social cohesion by 
bringing the parties together in a mutually-satisfying exchange.  
64  See Hirschman, supra note 5, at 107–09.   
65  Id. at 112. 
66  Id. 
67  Id. at 115–16 (citations omitted). 
68  Id. at 114–15 (citations omitted). 
69  Hirschman, supra note 5, at 117 (citations omitted). 
70  See supra text accompanying note 49. 
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“the advanced division of labor in modern society, and the importance of credit 
for the functioning of the economy, rest on, and promote, a high degree of 
truthfulness in social relations.”71  Hirschman even recognized that the doux-
commerce thesis seemed to have the greatest resiliency against the self-destruction 
thesis in the context of studies of international trade, for “[o]nly with regard to 
international trade was it still asserted from time to time, usually as an 
afterthought, that expanding transactions would bring, not only mutual material 
gains, but also some fine by-products in the cultural and moral realms, such as 
intellectual cross-fertilization and mutual understanding and peace.”72   
It goes without saying that, in the context of this longstanding debate 
over the degree to which market society inculcates, destroys, or ultimately must 
depend on virtue among market participants, Kozolchyk’s work is a welcome 
theoretical—but more importantly, empirical—contribution.  Indeed, the logic of 
the reasonable is not for merchants alone.  Kozolchyk’s message to transactional 
lawyers in the emerging global environment is that, in addition to understanding 
the best practices of any setting, they must take on the responsibility of becoming 
the “guardians” of the good faith of the individual transaction.73  For lawyers and 
lawyer-students of the Talmud or the New Testament, as well as other faiths and 
secular religions, there could not be a more inspirational note upon which to end 
so rich and stimulating a volume as CCC.  
 
 
III. THE OAS AND CIDIP: THEORY ROOTED IN EXPERIENCE 
 
For those looking for inspiration in practice rather than theory, 
Kozolchyk’s role in the Inter-American process of legal cooperation provides 
numerous examples of how his methodology can produce results.  Indeed, it is the 
wealth of experience that has given rise to CCC that is perhaps is the best possible 
explanation for the quality of Kozolchyk’s theoretical contribution to the process 
of legal harmonization in the Western Hemisphere.  That process, as this Part will 
also show, provides examples of the consequences for failing to follow 
Kozolchyk’s precepts, providing additional evidence for the need to take CCC 
seriously.   
It is necessary to begin with the observation that Kozolchyk’s work on 
comparative law and economic development grows out of his personal history, 
beginning in Cuba under the constraints the civil law tradition imposed on his own 
father’s activities as a merchant.  These life experiences return throughout CCC in 
various forms and delightfully inform the reader of the man behind the 
manuscript.74  But the intellectual journey of these beginnings launched 
                                                            
71  Hirschman, supra note 5, at 121 (citations omitted). 
72  Id. at 118.   
73  KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 1247. 
74  Kozolchyk discloses that his mother’s entire family, it turns out, was 
exterminated by the Nazis. See id. at 377.  And he recounts the medieval atrocities of the 
Frankfort Ghetto, which nonetheless eventually became the launching point for the 
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Kozolchyk on a voyage through Latin American, European, and American legal 
scholarship, sent him to field research in Central America and Mexico, and finally 
brought him to port at The University of Arizona and the NCLFT.75  Under 
Kozolchyk’s stewardship, the NCLFT became a forum for technical cooperation 
among commercial practitioners in the NAFTA countries in a number of areas: 
among others, the development of codes of conduct that would facilitate the 
development of common standards for activities as mundane as cross-border 
check clearing, the checking of letter of credit documents for technical compliance 
with required elements, and the effective transfer of truckers bills of lading.76  In 
these efforts, Kozolchyk, perhaps like a religious convert from a childhood civil 
law education to an adult faith in common-law methodology, followed a common 
law lawyer’s practice of fully understanding all the material—as he would say, 
“nuclear” facts; only such understanding would yield a basis for finding the 
critical elements that would need to be reformed to ensure the durable success of 
these exchanges by means of realizing the reciprocally-altruistic behavioral 
standards of the archetypal merchant.77  In the case of developing a “roadmap” for 
effective truck bills of lading, for example, this required NLCIFT researchers to 
be “present during the issuances of truck bills of lading in Canada, the United 
States, and Mexico” and “when cargo shipped from Canada or the United States 
was delivered to the consignee/buyers in Mexico.”78  In the case of developing 
common standards for the examination of letter of credit documents before their 
acceptance for payment, in implementation of new UCP rules, this entailed 
working with bankers associations in the United States and Mexico to conduct a 
document-by-document, objection-by-objection review of each group’s practices, 
                                                            
Rothschilds, whose role in the development of European commerce plays a central part in 
Kozolchyk’s story.  See id. at 397–99; see also supra text accompanying note 54.  But he 
also tells the far more heart-warming story of his introduction to business as a part-time silk 
cloth salesman in his father’s store in Cuba, where he learned the importance of credibility 
and trust in market life.  See KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 489–90.  He had, in fact, 
replaced a much taller salesman, and the usual measure of length of the cloth, and therefore 
the price of the quantity to be sold, in terms of the length of the salesman’s arm needed to 
be adjusted to take into account his somewhat shorter stature, a limitation with which no 
doubt many of us can empathize. See id.  
75  See Staff Members, NATIONAL LAW CENTER FOR INTER-AMERICAN FREE TRADE 
(NLCIFT), http://natlaw.com/staff/dr-boris-kozolchykbk (last visited Oct. 20, 2016) 
(providing a concise account of Dr. Kozolchyk’s academic career and role at the NLCIFT).  
Dr. Kozolchyk, despite his retirement as Executive Director, will continue as a member of 
the Board of Directors and Director of Research.  See Leah Sandwell-Weiss, Arizona Law 
Welcomes Don De Amicis as Executive Director of NatLaw, U. ARIZ. JAMES E. ROGERS C. 
L. (Sept. 16, 2015), https://law.arizona.edu/arizona-law-welcomes-don-de-amicis-executive
-director-natlaw. 
76  See Kozolchyk, Trans-Pacific, supra note 4, at 44–49.   
77  Id. at 49.   
78  Id. at 48.    
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with detailed explanations of the reasons for objections, in an effort to identify the 
true “reasons for their disparate practices.”79   
Yet Kozolchyk’s most important achievement, and perhaps the polar star 
for CCC, is the OAS Model Law on Secured Transactions.80  Here too the 
emergence of agreed principles was made possible only through detailed study of 
relevant sectoral practices.  In Mexico, for example, this included, among other 
things:  the role of national identity cards in determining the legal status of 
debtors; the typical reliance of poor farmers on usurious lenders in Mexican 
agriculture; the lack of a reliable system for cattle identification; and the practice 
of not producing reliable records to identify the value of potential collateral 
because doing so would undercut efforts to avoid tax collection.81  It should be 
noted that the Model Law on Secured Transactions is one of the chief 
accomplishments of the CIDIP process under the OAS, with, unlike so many other 
products of the CIDIP process, increasing prospects for implementation 
throughout the Western Hemisphere.82  
In all of these efforts, grounded on a deep understanding of the facts, 
Kozolchyk’s approach then called upon the parties to employ what Kozolchyk 
calls the “logic of the reasonable.”83 Sometimes this entailed asking parties to set 
aside their prejudices, including the claim of “cultural imperialism,” under which 
it was asked “‘Why is it that Mexico must import its trade and commercial laws 
from Canada and the United States and the same is not true the other way 
around?’”84  It is not the logic of the rational or mere deductive logic.  It is, rather, 
“inseparably linked to transaction facts and sectoral facts,” and the success of 
these efforts demonstrated that “commercial lawyers who are trained as 
comparative and contextual analyst are the best equipped to determine who should 
be treated fairly, i.e., as equals or better, and who should not.”85  For Kozolchyk, 
when theory and practice meet, progress becomes possible—a somewhat ironic 
legacy for a refugee, like Kozolchyk, who left behind a political system in Cuba 
ostensibly committed to the Marxist belief in the so-called unity of theory and 
practice.86  Since Kozolchyk and Marx no doubt do not share common ground in 
                                                            
79  Id. at 47.   
80  See OAS, Model Secured Transactions, supra note 11.  
81  See KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 75–79. See also Boris Kozolchyk & Dale 
Furnish, The OAS Model Law on Secured Transactions: A Comparative Analysis, 12 SW. J. 
L. & TRADE AM. 235 (2006); Boris Kozolchyk & John M. Wilson, The Organization of 
American States: The New Model Inter-American Law on Secured Transactions 7 UNIF. L. 
REV. 69 (2002) (providing a more detailed exposition of the drafting process and the 
elements of the OAS Model Law on Secured Transactions).   
82  See Boris Kozolchyk, Implementation of the OAS Model Law in Latin America: 
Current Status, 28 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (2011) (reporting on developments and 
adoptions in the first decade of the Model Law’s availability). 
83  See Kozolchyk, Trans-Pacific, supra note 4, at 55.    
84  KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 73.   
85  Kozolchyk, Trans-Pacific, supra note 4, at 55.  
86  See Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 107, 109 
(Robert C. Tucker ed., 1972) (stating in Thesis XI: “The philosophers have only interpreted 
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what this means, it might be better to say that his methods realize the vision of the 
hedgehog with the skills of the fox.  
By contrast, in this author’s experience as a member of the OAS Inter-
American Juridical Committee (IJC) from 2005 to 2008, failed CIDIP exercises 
are characterized by approaches that fail to unify theory and practice.  To evaluate 
this claim, however, one needs to understand the historical context for the role of 
the IJC and the CIDIP process as vehicles for private international law 
cooperation in the Western Hemisphere, which can in fact be traced to the 
beginnings of the Inter-American legal community at the end of the 19th 
century.87  For Latin Americans, much of the mythology of private international 
law cooperation is based on the signal achievement in the early 20th century of the 
promulgation of the so-called Bustamante Code (in honor of its chief draftsman, 
the Cuban professor Antonio Sánchez de Bustamante y Sirvén) at the Sixth 
International Conference of American States at Havana in 1928.88  Drawing on 
earlier work of the civilian countries in the region, the Code was in fact a set of 
choice-of-law rules, rather than a set of substantive principles for private law 
harmonization.89   
When, after a series of procedural and institutional transformations, the 
IJC as the chief legal advisory organ of the OAS emerged as the successor to the 
committee responsible for the Bustamante Code, it seemed natural for the IJC, 
whose members are elected by the General Assembly of the OAS,90 to take up the 
task of harmonizing the civilian-inspired choice-of-law rules adopted at the pre-
war Havana Conference with the choice-of-law rules of the United States.  But as 
luck and fate would have it, the attempt at choice-of-law harmonization was 
doomed from the start: first, federalist concerns prevented US negotiators from 
accepting the possibility that choice-of-law rules could be the subject of a federal 
treaty harmonizing US rules with civilian methods; and second, at precisely that 
moment, US courts were beginning to fashion a choice-of-law revolution that 
began to displace largely territorialist, choice-of-law rules, inspired by civil law, 
                                                            
the world, in various way; the point, however, is to change it” (emphasis added)).  For the 
full-blown explication of this view, see Karl Marx, The German Ideology, Part I, in THE 
MARX-ENGELS READER, supra at 110.  
87  See Antonio F. Perez, The Inter-American Juridical Committee and Private 
International Law in the Americas (or a Roadmap for Making the Best the Enemy of the 
Good), in EL COMITÉ JURÍDICO INTERAMERICANO: UN SIGLO DE APORTES AL DERECHO 
INTERNACIONAL 299, 300–05 (2007)  [hereinafter Perez, IAJC] (discussing the pre-history 
of the OAS and IJC in the Montevideo Conferences of 1888-89 and 1939-40); see also 
Antonio Perez, Consumer Protection in the Americas: A Second Wave of American 
Revolutions?,  5 ST. THOMAS L. J. 698 (2008) [hereinafter Perez, Second Wave] (providing 
an economic analysis, taking into account national and regional market differences, of the 
need for greater consumer protection, also as a vehicle for greater empowerment of 
disadvantaged groups of consumers and producers).  
88  See Perez, IAJC, supra note 87, at 305 n.28 (citation omitted).    
89  See id. at 310–11.   
90  See Charter of the Organization of American States art. 101, Apr. 30, 1948, 119 
U.N.T.S. 3.  
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with so-called governmental interest and other methodologies.  The retreat from 
civilian-inspired territorialism in US conflicts doctrine thus reduced the likelihood 
of agreement on a common theoretical approach.  Indeed, the US choice-of-law 
“revolution” included even methods that were variants on ancient attempts to find 
the “best” or at least “better” law in multi-state transactions, much as the praetor 
peregrinus through edicts governing disputes between Romans and non-Romans 
in antiquity fashioned the so-called jus gentium.91  Looking at the content of the 
law and its quality was as far away as one could imagine from the traditional 
civilian method of choosing the law of a jurisdiction without regard to that law’s 
content or quality. 
However, the IJC’s persistence in seeking to resurrect the Bustamante 
Code in effect marginalized it, as the OAS member states voted to create an 
alternative process involving representatives of the member states and private 
sector representatives, the CIDIP, which might prove more productive.92  The new 
CIDIP process disdained efforts to resurrect the Bustamante Code and pursued a 
more pragmatic agenda.  It lowered its sights even in pursuing private 
international law conventions; rather than embarking on wholly new projects, it 
merely adapted some of the instruments produced at the universal Hague 
Conference on Private International Law to serve Latin American needs.93  More 
importantly, by the mid-1990s, the CIDIP began to focus on the possibility of 
substantive law harmonization—with the breakthrough coming in 1996 in the 
aftermath of the eruption of free trade instruments during that period, when the 
OAS General Assembly specifically approved the promotion of instruments to 
promote free trade.  With this new impetus, the CIDIP produced Model Laws that 
could serve to harmonize substantive private law rules and help to create a level 
playing field for market participants throughout the Americas.  It was in this 
context that the CIDIP, with the able assistance of Kozolchyk and the NLCIFT, 
were able to produce the Model Law on Secured Transactions and its successor 
projects.94   
Tragically, it was only in the aftermath of the failed effort to produce a 
free trade agreement for the whole hemisphere that the issue of consumer 
protection emerged as a priority topic in the CIDIP agenda.95  The effort might 
have been a bridge too far to begin with; for, unlike prior CIDIP topics, the 
consumer protection problem could be viewed from the lens of overall distributive 
justice and the special role of the state in protecting the community from mass 
tort.96  But as it turned out, the issue simply became a vehicle for replaying the 
struggles of the past between those who would pursue efforts to allocate 
sovereignty through choice-of-law rules on one hand and, on the other, those who 
                                                            
91  See Perez, IAJC, supra note 87, at 310–17 (citations omitted).   
92  See id. at 317–24 (citations omitted).   
93  See id. at 324–27 (citations omitted). 
94  See id. at 327–28 n.129. 
95  See MICHAEL REID, THE FORGOTTEN CONTINENT: THE BATTLE FOR LATIN 
AMERICA’S SOUL 309 (2007).    
96  See Perez, Second Wave, supra note 87, at 701. 
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wished to focus on the substantive contract rules that (taking into account the need 
of all stakeholders for fair and reasonable protection of their interests) might 
afford consumers effective protection.   
The United States, Canada, and Brazil each submitted proposals for 
instruments.  Brazil, recalling the methods of the Bustamante Code, proposed a 
choice-of-law treaty with a wrinkle.  Under Brazil’s proposal the law of the 
consumer’s home would govern, except that when the contract contained a choice-
of-law clause the “law most favorable to the consumer” would then govern.  
Nothing in the proposal made clear the criteria that would be used to determine 
which country’s law was “most favorable” or even what constituted the relevant 
“law” on the question.97  The Canadian treaty proposal, informed by civil law 
thought but practically directed primarily at electronic commerce, purported to 
regulate jurisdiction, enabling consumers to sue anywhere a seller or producer’s 
assets could be found; yet the proposal, like the Brazilian proposal, included 
choice-of-law rules applying the consumer’s home forum law, also ignoring the 
parties’ choice of law (albeit not when “the vendor demonstrates that he or she 
took reasonable steps to avoid concluding consumer contracts with consumers 
residing” in the consumer’s home state).98  The US proposal, by contrast, included 
a set of model laws and legislative guides taking account of the public law 
dimension of consumer protection, including:  draft models laws for strengthening 
governmental consumer protection authorities; simplified tribunals for small 
consumer claims; collective or representational dispute resolution and redress for 
common injuries to consumers; and electronic arbitration of small claims.  The US 
proposal thus focused on mechanisms to generate effective remedies in private 
adjudication and, when small claims could not be cost-effectively pursued in 
ordinary adjudication, instead through governmental or collective (such as class 
action) mechanisms.  The US proposal was a harmonization scheme targeting the 
law of remedies, designed to ensure that innocent consumers—like bona fide 
purchasers for value who can negotiate or collect on instruments in their 
possession or innocent creditors able to enforce their rights through self-help in 
taking possession of collateral without a breach of the peace—are protected 
through effective remedial mechanisms.99  
It should be noted that these disagreements were replicated at the level of 
the IJC, where multiple reporters reflecting these competing views were unable to 
forge a common position to enable the IJC to participate effectively in the CIDIP 
process as counselor or intermediary.100  Given the incommensurability of these 
                                                            
97  See id. at 702–03 (citations omitted). 
98  Id. at 703. 
99  See id.  
100  See Organization of American States, Annual Report of the Inter-American 
Juridical Committee to the General Assembly 2006, OEA/Ser.Q/VI.37 CJI/doc 237/06 
(Aug. 7-25, 2006), http://www.oas.org/en/sla/iajc/docs/INFOANUAL.CJI.2006.ING.pdf.  
One might compare the different analytical approaches of the members assigned to monitor 
CIDIP developments for the IJC.  This author, who was then a member of the IJC, 
submitted an individual report reflecting a pragmatic, common law orientation.  See id. at 
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approaches, it should not be surprising that no progress has been made in either 
forum.  Indeed, because of the impasse, the General Assembly of the OAS 
ultimately removed the issue from the CIDIP agenda and, as reported to the IJC 
by the OAS Secretariat’s Legal Director Dante Negro, “the topic was sent back to 
the Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs via the Permanent Council”101—
thus bringing to an end a misbegotten effort to impose abstract choice-of-law 
treaty solutions in the absence of the kind of factual knowledge and practical 
inquiry that preceded the success of the Model Law on Secured Transactions.  
Adding insult to injury, he “used the opportunity to urge the Committee to present 
new topics or proposals that might be of interest for future contributions.”102  
The message was clear: neither the IJC nor CIDIP could make progress 
on consumer protection issues while they remained deadlocked on fundamental 
questions of methodology.  And the IJC seemed to get the message.  In a search 
for new issues that would enable it to “contribute to these issues without falling 
prey to the paralysis of the last CIDIP,” the IJC added to its agenda the study of “a 
uniform law governing customs receipts relating to the transportation of 
agricultural products.”103 While mundane, this decision signaled a return to the 
course that produced the Model Law on Secured Transactions.  Although progress 
remains glacial, it should be noted that the IJC’s work is being slowed, not by 
theoretical concerns, but rather by resource limitations in convening the 
substantive experts whose knowledge is essential to producing an instrument that 
                                                            
76–78. The Salvadoran member, Dr. Ana Elizabeth Villalta Vizcarra, submitted a report 
drawing on the civil law tradition that favored the Brazilian proposal.  See id. at 66–71.  
Interestingly, however, a third reporter, the Brazilian member of the committee, despite his 
civil law orientation, joined the US reporter to express concern about the legal uncertainty 
that would be generated by the Brazilian proposal for a choice-of-law treaty.  See id. at 78–
79.  These tensions continue to characterize the IJC’s deliberations, with even more 
extensive and divergent reports as the parallel CIDIP process also could not bridge its 
differences.  See Organization of American States, Annual Report of the Inter-American 
Juridical Committee to the General Assembly 2007, OEA/Ser.Q/VII.38 CJI/doc.286/07 
(Aug. 10, 2007), http://www.oas.org/en/sla/iajc/docs/INFOANUAL.CJI.2007.ING.pdf; 
Organization of American States, Annual Report of the Inter-American Juridical 
Committee to the General Assembly 2008, OEA/Ser.Q/VI.39 CJI/doc.316/08 (Aug. 14, 
2008), http://www.oas.org/en/sla/iajc/docs/INFOANUAL.CJI.2008.ENG.pdf.  Finally, Dr. 
Villalta and the author’s successor at the IJC, David Stewart, reported to the IJC that the 
CIDIP process on consumer protection issues had come to an “impasse” and, in Stewart’s 
words, “the current situation does not give much room for any action by the Juridical 
Committee” and the IJC “would have to await the outcome of the negotiations of the 
countries” before it “could resume the active role it had been playing in the process for 
codification of private international law.”  Organization of American States, Annual Report 
of the Inter-American Juridical Committee to the General Assembly 2009,  
OEA/Ser.Q/XIX.40 CJI/doc.425/12 (Aug. 14, 2009), http://www.oas.org/en/sla/iajc/docs
/INFOANUAL.CJI.2009.ENG.pdf [hereinafter OAS, 2009 Annual Report].  
101  OAS, 2009 Annual Report, supra note 100.  
102  Id. 
103  Id. at 129 (selecting the US member, David Stewart, as the IJC’s reporter for this 
new project).   
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could have the desired practical effects.104  This kind of glacial progress is best, 
for “it makes haste slowly.”105  
Comparing the effects of Dr. Kozolchyk’s participation in the CIDIP 
process with the failed efforts to address the problem of consumer protection as a 
spur to trade, one might generalize, following the work of Friedrich Jeunger, the 
noted comparativist and conflict of laws scholar, that choice of law methods of 
various forms have failed to achieve anything of permanent value and should be 
discarded and replaced with an honest pursuit of the best law that should govern 
multi-state transactions.106  As shown by Kozolchyk’s successful work and the 
failed counter-example of the IJC and CIDIP’s effort to improve cooperation on 
consumer protection, abstract choice-of-law theorizing distracts states from 
developing effective mechanisms for consumer protection that take into account 
the diversity of settings and interests of the countries involved.  It appears, rather, 
that the sine qua non for progress at the IJC and CIDIP is to follow Kozolchyk’s 
methodology: grasp fully the facts on the ground through conversation with all 
interested stakeholders, and seek to reach agreement on the basis of the best 
practices of the archetypal merchant or market-participant, Ulpian’s bonus vir.   
Indeed, that learning process may have already begun.  The failed 
consumer protection effort, coupled with the well-received Model Law on 
Secured Transactions, seem to have prompted the OAS and its CIDIP process to 
move in a direction suggest by Kozolchyk’s CCC.  Now, with an effort to produce 
a new Model Law for Warehouse Receipts for Agricultural Products, the IJC’s 
membership seems to recognize the relationship between legal harmonization, 
especially with respect to documents covering goods, and the flow of commerce 
and credit, especially for small- and medium-sized enterprises;107 and that 
                                                            
104  See Organization of American States, Annual Report of the Inter-American 
Juridical Committee to the General Assembly 2015, at 42, OEA/Ser.Q CJI/doc.495/15  
(Sept. 8, 2015), http://scm.oas.org/pdfs/2016/CP35451EREPORTCJI.pdf [hereinafter OAS, 
2015 Annual Report]. See also Organization of American States, Annual Report of the 
Inter-American Juridical Committee to the Forty-Fourth Regular Session of the General 
Assembly, at 104–112, OEA/Ser.G CP/doc.4956/14 (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.oas.org
/en/sla/iajc/docs/INFOANUAL.CJI.2013.ENG.pdf (providing a useful study by the IJC 
reporter drawing on Kozolchyk’s methodology in order to construct a set of principles to 
govern warehouse receipts, akin to Kozolchyk’s principles for a model law on Model Law 
on Secured Transactions).   
105  The phrase, “festina lente,” is attributed to Augustus Caesar and is deemed a 
reflection of his wisdom. See Festina Lente, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki
/Festina_lente (last visited Oct 21, 2016).  
106  See generally FRIEDRICH JEUNGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 
(1993) (calling, in effect, for a return to the methods of the Roman praetor peregrinus, 
whose edicts governing cases between Romans and non-Romans gave rise to the so-called 
jus gentium). 
107  See OAS, 2015 Annual Report, supra note 104, at 36 (stressing “the positive 
effects that developments in electronic warehouse receipts for agricultural products could 
have on the economics of the countries, particularly on small-scale agricultural goods 
producing companies”).  
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recognition may now benefit from the fertile ground that may now be emerging 
with pro-market political and economic reform in the region.108  In short, if Latin 
Americans are to realize fully their potential for economic and human 
development, Kozolchyk’s insight that reciprocal altruism and the protection of 
strangers (including consumers and small businesses seeking entry in foreign 
markets) rather than excessive preferences for insiders (such as kin and even 
nationals) must become the organizing principle for commercial law in the 
Americas.  
 
 
IV. NEW CHALLENGES IN GLOBAL PRO-DEVELOPMENT PRIVATE 
LAW HARMONIZATION 
 
Even if Kozolchyk’s methodology is a sine qua non for progress in 
private law harmonization, it may not be a sufficient condition.  Cultural change 
may be necessary, especially in the case of the Latin and Asian cultures, which 
Kozolchyk shows are permeated by familism.  After describing the impediments 
familism creates in Latin America for the acceptance of legal rules that protect 
third parties, and the encouragement it gives to simulated practices to conceal 
illegality or other forms of corruption in order to privilege kin and other 
insiders,109 CCC includes three full chapters on the roots and nature of the Chinese 
commercial legal system, drawing attention to the fact that Chinese commercial 
law, like Latin American law,110 has been culturally constrained in its protection 
of third-parties.111   
                                                            
108  See Shannon K. O'Neil, Argentina and Brazil Grow Together, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN REL.: LATIN AMERICA’S MOMENT (July 15, 2016), http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil
/2016/07/15/argentina-and-brazil-grow-together/ (discussing recent political and economic 
changes in Brazil and Argentina).  
109  See KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 475–543.  
110  Id. at 476. Kozolchyk notes: “Surprisingly, especially to someone born and raised 
in Latin America, the early legal cultures of Latin America and China had important 
elements in common. In addition to the not-very-dissimilar versions of familism and 
legalism, including a tendency to monopolize commerce and to treat contracting parties 
who are members of the extended family better than non-members, pre-colonial and 
colonial Latin America and Chinese ‘commoners’ shared another important attitude: their 
respect for and obedience to those who were their social, political and military hierarchical 
superiors.  In the case of the family, the obedience was to the patrilineal hierarchy, and 
where legalism was concerned, the obedience to the chieftain (caudillo) warlord or emperor 
was strengthened by their being equated by the governed to heads of their family 
households.” Id. For Kozolchyk, familism in these contexts means “a legal culture whose 
institutions are designed to protect the best interests of the family as an economic unit, 
including actual and ‘fictive’ kin members (such as the Mexican compadre or the Chinese 
Guanxi) and economic dependents, at the expense of the ‘strangers’ or ‘third parties.’”  
Legalism means “the method of enacting and enforcing laws by authoritative rulers 
accompanied by an appearance of having observed lawful procedures. It is only an 
appearance because these rulers do not reflect the consent of the governed any more than 
they are the product of the wisdom or higher morality of the ruler.  At their most basic, 
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But Kozolchyk also makes an important allusion to the tensions that are 
being created in the world economy’s efforts to integrate China in his discussion 
of the emergence of the modern LOC.  Because of disputes concerning charges for 
a “negotiation commission” to “beneficiaries” by negotiating, issuing and 
confirming banks, so simple a term as “negotiation” was in urgent need of 
clarification.  Kozolchyk observed that “[s]ince the claims of fraudulent tender of 
documents multiplied during the 1980s, especially with the large volume of 
shipments to and from China, this legal clarification was of considerable 
commercial and economic significance.”112  Implicitly, if not explicitly, this 
account draws attention to the question of the implications of traditional patterns 
of Chinese culture and economy for global legal harmonization. 
This review concludes, therefore, with a discussion of the key causes for 
concern about Chinese culture and law in the context of the requirements for 
effectiveness set forth in CCC.  It then locates Kozolchyk’s concerns in a larger 
literature (which is of relevance both to Latin America and China) about the 
transformation of traditional kinship patterns of trust into alternative models that 
provide greater cultural acceptance for the protection of strangers or could, 
alternatively, erode the progress that has been made in building the cultural habits 
underlying laws that protect strangers.  A capsule summary of chapters 17 through 
19 of CCC in no way does justice to the complexities of Chinese history, law, and 
culture.  But for those without a prior background in this subject, these chapters 
are essential reading, for they reveal core concerns about the future that are 
implicit in Kozolchyk’s account of how the rise of China destabilized modern 
LOC practices.  Those concerns may even include the possible threat China could 
pose to the Western cultural habits that have given rise to the creditor-protecting 
instruments that are now key vehicles for the reduction of global poverty.    
Kozolchyk’s three chapters lay the foundations of Chinese commercial 
law in historic Chinese culture, then discuss imperial and Maoist law, and then 
culminate with an analysis of current Chinese law of commercial contracts.  The 
first—and perhaps most important—point Kozolchyk uncovers is that the father of 
Chinese thought, Confucius, placed merchants at the bottom of China’s intensely 
hierarchical social order, for “all they cared about was their ‘gain’ or profit-
making.”113  The intensity of familism in defiance of public norms, like Mexico’s 
compadrazgo and every Mexican’s “natural right to smuggle,” while traditional 
Chinese culture justifies the refusal of a son, as an “upright” man, to turn his own 
father in to the authorities even when the father had committed a crime.114  
                                                            
these legalistic rules reflect the coercive power and pleasure of the sovereign or ruler.” Id. 
at 475.  Not surprisingly, when familism and legalism combine, the basic legitimacy of 
formally-enacted law is perilous at best.   
111  See id. at 623–746.   
112  KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 1067.    
113  Id. at 635 n.61 (citing leading Chinese historians JOHN FAIRBANK & MERLE 
GOLDMAN, A NEW HISTORY 108 (2006)).  
114  Id. at 640 (quoting the teachings in writings attributed to CONFUCIUS, THE 
ANALECTS (c. 500 B.C.E)) (citations omitted). 
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Merchants lacked autonomy, moreover, as they became adjuncts of the imperial 
bureaucracy’s monopolization of the sale and distribution of scarce commodities 
and the metallic coin that served as the medium of exchange.115  Even when 
merchants achieved limited autonomy, exclusive dealing arrangements between 
the state and merchants continued to reinforce patterns of patronage, ultimately 
forging, “after a longstanding relationship of reciprocal services and duties had 
been established between the parties to this relationship,” a “living law” that “was, 
and still is, known as Guanxi.”116  
The practical effects of this cultural background in commercial law 
development in China are myriad, and a detailed summary is beyond the scope of 
this review.  But suffice it to say that, as in Latin America, third-party rights were 
subordinated to familial interests.117  Not surprisingly, notwithstanding the Maoist 
effort to revolutionize society and even human nature, habitual indifference to 
third-party interests continued; but now the interests of collective farms 
substituted for privileged interests of families and their extended Guanxi 
networks.118  For Kozolchyk, notwithstanding Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatism,119 
the legacy of Chinese familism and authoritarian-legalism continues today.  
Critically, law remains imprecise and therefore “invertebrate,”120 so much so that 
ill-defined property rights make it impossible for secured creditors to have 
confidence in the enforceability of their rights to collateral (not title, given the 
abolition of private property in land, but long-term leaseholds) in real property,121 
much less movable property or intangibles such as accounts receivables.122  Thus, 
the weakness of commercial law continues to facilitate commerce through 
Guanxi, even as the PRC seeks to join the world economy.  It is, therefore, not 
surprising that Kozolchyk drew special attention to the role of Guanxi in de-
stabilizing LOC practices as global trade with China expanded.123  Kozolchyk’s 
account seems to suggest that these cultural legacies, as in Latin America, might 
set an upper-bound to the PRC’s efforts to modernize.124  Could it even be argued 
that trade with China on Chinese cultural terms will de-stabilize the cultural 
inheritance of non-Chinese participants in Chinese commerce? 
                                                            
115  Id. at 547.  
116  Id. at 662 (citations omitted).   
117  KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 665–84.   
118  Id. at 685–94 (citations omitted).   
119  Id. at 696 (quoting Deng’s famous aphorism: “It doesn’t matter whether or not a 
cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice.”) (citations omitted). 
120  Id. at 700–07. 
121  Id. at 707–37. 
122  KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 737–46.  
123  See supra text accompanying notes 110–11.  
124  But see Amira Fellner, Role of Culture in Economic Development: Case study of 
China and Latin America (Apr. 11, 2008) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Southern 
Florida), http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1235&context=etd 
(arguing that Chinese family networks facilitate cooperation with neighboring Chinese 
communities in East Asia, promoting foreign investment and free trade, while Latin 
American family networks fail to promote development). 
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Francis Fukuyama, in a work that might have informed Kozolchyk’s 
CCC, presciently argued that “social trust” is a critical variable in economic 
development.  He posited that when cultures evidence a high degree of trust 
among social groups beyond the family, even business enterprises can trust each 
other, business costs are thereby reduced, and a comparative advantage in 
economic development arises.125  Drawing on the work of Max Weber, Fukuyama 
argued that “there are ethical habits, such as the ability to associate spontaneously, 
that are crucial to organization innovation and therefore to the creation of wealth.  
Different types of ethical habits are conducive to alternative forms of economic 
organization and lead to large variation in economic structure.”126  But, he argues, 
at a minimum the decline of trust serves as a tax on the economy, even if some 
partial substitution of its benefits can be achieved through vertical integration of 
economic activities rather than relying on contract parties for goods and services.  
Fukuyama notes that “[w]ithout trust, there will be a strong incentive to bring 
these activities in-house and restore the old hierarchies.”127  He also seeks to 
correct what he considers a common misconception about the United States and 
Japan; these are, in his view, historically high-trust societies, which have been 
populated with many intermediate groups between the family and the state, thus 
facilitating low-cost business cooperation and thus, even without state support, the 
creation of large business organizations.128  By contrast, he argues, the “nature of 
Chinese Confucianism . . .  may mean that China may never be able to duplicate 
Japan’s development path.”129  It goes without saying, however, that Fukuyama’s 
conjecture concerning China’s capacity for development and technological 
development remains a highly contested question.130 
                                                            
125  See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES & THE CREATION OF 
PROSPERITY 34 (1995) [hereinafter FUKUYAMA, TRUST].   
126  Id. at 37 (citing MAX WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 
(1905), which attributed the emergence of the social “capital” of spontaneous sociability to 
shared participation in religious activities).  Kozolchyk’s discussion of the rise of German-
Jewish merchants as trusted intermediaries in medieval and modern commerce is an insight 
that would fit nicely into Weber’s framework.  See KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 
153–63, 397–407.   
127  FUKUYAMA, TRUST, supra note 125, at 25; see also Richman, supra note 54 
(observing that the decline of trust in the New York City diamond dealers’ market was 
accompanied by the rise of vertical integration, thus eliminating the dealers as 
intermediaries between diamond producers and consumers, in the diamond industry as a 
whole).    
128  FUKUYAMA, TRUST, supra note 125, at 28.   
129  Id. at 31, 57.  For an assessment paralleling the commonality Kozolchyk finds 
between China and Latin America, which Fukuyama extends to, among others, France and 
portions of Italy, see id. at 5–56. 
130  See Emily Rauhala, Behind the Firewall: How China Tamed the Internet—
America Wants to Believe China Can’t Innovate. Tech Tells a Different Story, WASH. POST 
(July 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/america-wants-to-
believe-china-cant-innovate-tech-tells-a-different-story/2016/07/19/c17cbea9-6ee6-479c-
81fa-54051df598c5_story.html.  
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More important for Kozolchyk’s vision for improving global commercial 
law, however, is Fukuyama’s central thesis: that is, the potential for the 
dissolution of trust.  Along with what later became a chorus of commentators, 
Fukuyama observed that US society is witnessing the erosion of the social capital 
he considered the well-spring of economic growth.131  If anything, the tendencies 
Fukuyama described twenty years ago have accelerated.132  Moreover, if the 
literature concerning the decline of spontaneous sociability in the United States is 
correct in its assessments,133 there is no reason to believe that the decline in this 
social capital will not have implications for the character of US merchants, their 
lawyers, and ultimately the kind of corporate and commercial law that is 
sustainable in the United States.  Perhaps the popular belief in the rise of “crony 
capitalism” in so many sectors of our economy is connected to this putative 
cultural erosion?134 Moreover, it would be hard to imagine that the ethical habits 
of US merchants and their lawyers would not erode as well when they must 
habitually operate in contexts dominated by familism or authoritarian-legalist 
methods.  
In sum, if commercial law is built on culture, and culture is the 
transmission of ethical habits,135 then, as Fukuyama has observed, cultural habits 
can unravel in the same way that they can be formed.  Is there a law of nature 
guaranteeing that the cultural habits Kozolchyk deems essential to effective 
commercial law will survive as globalization proceeds?  Of course not.  These 
values and habits may well recede in the next century, just as they receded in the 
                                                            
131  FUKUYAMA, TRUST, supra note 125, at 269–321.  
132  See ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE (2000) (detailing the disintegration of 
social structures in the U.S., yielding reduced sociability); CHARLES MURRAY, COMING 
APART (2012) (analyzing the increasing separation between American elite and working 
classes); ROBERT PUTNAM, OUR KIDS (2015) (critiquing the increasing divergence of life 
prospects between children of the wealthy and children of poverty); YUVAL LEVIN, THE 
FRACTURED REPUBLIC: RENEWING AMERICA’S SOCIAL CONTRACT IN THE AGE OF 
INDIVIDUALISM (2016) (calling for the revival of institutions, such as churches, unions, and 
charities, to intermediate between the family and the state). The cumulative theme in these 
volumes, as foreseen by Fukuyama, is concern for an increasing alienation and declining 
sociability across all segments of American society, thereby reducing social capital 
understood as solidarity and trust.  
133  The study of social networks is receiving extensive empirical and theoretical 
attention in a range of disciplines, giving rise to the hope that a better understanding of how 
social capital evolves or devolves may soon become available. See, e.g., DAVID EASLEY & 
JON KLEINBERG, NETWORKS, CROWDS, AND MARKETS: REASONING ABOUT A HIGHLY 
CONNECTED WORLD (2010) (describing a mathematical approach to the study of networks, 
utilizing, inter alia, graph theory, game theory, and information theory). 
134  See STEVEN BRILL, AMERICA’S BITTER PILL: MONEY, POLITICS, BACKROOM 
DEALS, AND THE FIGHT TO FIX OUR BROKEN HEALTHCARE SYSTEM 194 (2015) (detailing the 
interest groups politics and corruption entailed in the enactment of Obamacare); and 
MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT (2010) (detailing the fraudulent practices in the mortgage-
backed securities and derivatives markets leading to the financial crisis). 
135  See FUKUYAMA, TRUST, supra note 125, at 34 (“culture is inherited ethical 
habit”).  
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past.  For, perhaps, it was declining spontaneous sociability—depriving Christian 
peasants of protection from rapacious landowners who provided credit only on 
usurious terms—that prompted Emperor Constantine’s repeal of the Pactum 
Commissorium.136  If so, a decline in cultural capital at the end of antiquity may 
have been the root cause of the reduced flow of credit and access to a means for 
escaping poverty and dependency.  Yet, if global commercial culture does indeed 
devolve in the next century, as it may have in the past, it will not be because Boris 
Kozolchyk failed to do his duty as teacher, scholar, practitioner, and inspiration to 
the next generation of commercial lawyers.    
 
  
                                                            
136  See KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 70; Kozolchyk, Trans-Pacific, supra note 
4, at 51. 
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